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Up to the present Hungary has not had an Act on International 
Private law- a Code of Conflict Law. The slow development and progress 
of the Hungarian International Private Law could not follow those of West 
Europe, 'fhe draft of a Private Law Code of 1900 contained a part regu­
lating Conflict Law similar to the German EG (Einfiihrugsgesetz), but 
this draft was never submitted to legislation.
Two other drafts were made by Professor István Szdszy in 1937 and 
1947. A new codification was initiated by the Institute of Political and 
Legal Sciences (Hungarian Academy of Sciences) in 1966 and a new draft 
was drawn up. Simultaneously Professor Miklós Világhy and Professor 
László Asztalos made a private draft taking into consideration all criti­
cisms on the former draft. This private draft became the basis of the codifi­
cation accomplished in 1970 under auspices of the Ministry of Justice. 
This study is going to present an approach to some theoretical problems 
of the recent codification.
1. Need for, and practicability of (lie codification of private internationallaw.
Codification of private international law,1 the need for this codifica­
tion, and its practical accomplishment are problems frequently discussed 
in modern literature of jurisprudence.2 Arguments and counterarguments, 
wishes and requirements manifest themselves among those accepting 
private international law in its narrower sense, i. e. as t he law of conflicts, 
in like way as among those who deal with this material of law in its wider 
sense, i. e. in its bearing on direct and indirect (conflicts) regulation.
a)  As for codification in both bourgeois and socialist literature actually 
two tendencies prevail. The one deals with codification in general,3 and 
within this scope it may show a certain concern with private international 
law. The other tendency analyses the codification of private international 
law, and in the course of this analysis is apt to contemplate the problem 
by itself, in a somewhat sterile manner, detached from the regulation oi 
domestic law.4
From the point of view of socialist law in general codification is of 
critical importance. As regards socialist codification attitudes of sig- 
nificance have been taken to the problem, and even in Hungarian litera- 
tuie, notwithstanding a certain backlog in codification work compared 
to the other people’s democracies,5 the need for, and the practical aspects 
oi codification have been accorded a position ol some prominence. As a 
matter o f course, and also in view of the way the question is approached, 
here we have to do in the first place with the need for, and the potentiali­
ties of, the regulation of substantive law, whereas for the present purpose 
apparently peripheral codification of private international law will be 
touched upon incidentally only.
Positions taken by scholars of private international law in connexion 
with codification work, and so also in Hungarian literature in the first 
place the utterances of Szászy, Világhy, Réezei and Mádl° setting out 
Írom private international law, primarily concern and justify the need 
for codification. However, need for, and potentiality of, the codification 
ot private international law exactly because of the foreign element implied 
m this codification, present two peculiariaties. First, the socialist jwincip- 
les followed at the formulation of the rules of domestic substantive law 
will manifest themselves in another form in private international law. 
Secondly, the codification of private international law is of necessity and 
also historically lagging behind the regulations of domestic substantive 
law whose relations implying a foreign element are brought under regula­
tion by private international law.
As for this latter question we can but welcome the systematization by 
Professor Szászy' which draws a comparison between the treaty-favouring 
universalist-internationalist theory, the partieularist-nationalist ten­
dency approving a codification by domestic law and the pragmatic- 
empiric tendency opposing both methods, and fundamentally rejecting 
codification altogether on the one side, and the actually established and 
realized codification, or such as bogged down simply in the experimental 
or project phase during one and a half centuries in the European develop­
ment, on the other. However, the particular tendencies expressed aspira­
tions only, and failed to display the real potentialities associated with a 
codification suiting the economic-social demands and needs, i. e. poten­
tialities which in the given international situation and in the relations 
of the given country prevailed in the problem of codification.
The discipline of private international law as a discipline proper, here 
too is to some extent lagging behind actual needs. At the same time, as has 
been emphasized also by Hungarian literature of private international 
law,8 for the purpose of a scope of law the significance of science will al­
ways be greater when the particular scope has not yet been codified.9
When now the formulation of the rules governing private internatio­
nal law are surveyed on a statutory level, then it is bevond doubt that t he 
nationalistic tendency following in the wake of the period of bourgeois 
revolutions was in the first ¡»lace intent upon codifying certain problems, 
which at a later stage proved to be such private international law, in
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association with domestic substantive law at that time gradually brought 
under regulation (e.g. the Code civil). (Naturally such partial codification 
preceding the bourgeois revolution made its appearance already in 
certain sections of the German Civil Code (Allgemeines bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch -  A15GB), moreover in the Allgemeines Landrecht -  
(ALR). Regulation bv international conventions which came to life in 
the second half of the 19th, and the opening years of the 20th centuries 
(e.g. in copyright law, or the Hague conventions) does not contradict 
the statement that codification is fundamentally a problem of domestic 
substantive law superservient to the codification of private law (e.g. the 
German Civil Code (BGB) and the Einführungsgesetz EG), which have 
come to be completed with the provisions of international conventions 
called forth by the gradual intensification of international relations10. 
In our opinion in reality in the liberal capitalistic phase of capitalist 
evolution, if the need for a regulation of these questions was recognized 
at all. in the first place they were brought under regulation in conjunction 
with the conflict rules associated with domestic substantive law. At the 
dawn of monopoly capitalism legal regulation was more and more vigoro­
usly completed by regulation by international conventions.
However, regulation bv international conventions also presents 
a peculiar picture. Does this regulation extend to the whole scope of 
what at that time was regarded as such of private international law ? 
The question has to be answered in the negative. Regulation bv intei- 
national conventions in the first place dealt with personal rights, and 
within them family law (e.g. the Hague conventions), secondarily with 
l he scope of intellectual property brought under a regulation of basically 
territorial effect, where the legal protection of publishers, or patentees 
(and their assignees) justified regulation by international conventions. (To 
these we have as a matter of course to add international conventions 
associated with commercial activities, such as those governing trade­
marks or collision of vessels at sea.) However, no regulation came into 
life, moreover no attempts were even made, in spheres of international 
economic relations or international trade, where merchants displaying 
activities in such relations, or the monopolies in statu nascendi could 
satisfy their needs partly by the rules of domestic substantive law, 
partly by contractual stipulations, without having recourse to a codi­
fication of conflict rules. _
However, the situation changed in the phase of monopoly capitalism, 
in the first place in the years following upon the First World War. The 
gathering vigour of internal nationalistic ideology did not favoui intei- 
national conventions, vet even so a number of conventions weic corn luded 
(so e.g. the Geneva convention on bills and cheques, the convention on 
arbitration), and recent civil codes, in line with this ideology, also contain 
provisions governing private international law (so e.g. the Greek civil 
code, the Italian Codice civile). However, whereas the liberal capitalistic 
phase itself, in particular its period consistently attaching to the bourge­
ois revolution, emphasized the need for codification, as the codification
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goveining the totality of a branch ol law, (lie phase o f monopoly capi­
talism. with its strained economic and social relations was in general 
hostile to codification". (This hostility manifested itself, o f course, with 
the peculiarities of the given country.) At the same time, in the phase of 
monopoly capitalism the first legislation relating to problems of private 
international law was promulgated which did not bring under regulation 
questions of conflict law as a by-product- of the codification of substantive 
law, but in the form of a self-contained code. Naturally the reasons prompt- 
ing codification in the given country may differ essentially from those in 
another. .So e.g. the Polish legislation of private inter-territorial and 
international law of 1920, set out from the given, only too justified 
private interterritorial law of Poland then regained her independence, 
and this legislation was then completed by provisions of private inter­
national law. At the same time the Czechoslovak and Rumanian drafts 
too set out from the need for a regulation of the situation presenting 
itself after the achievement of political independence.
The Cddigo Bustamente of 1928 departs from these legislations.
I his code had as its objective the regulation of the in many respects 
common traditions and interests of the peoples of Latin America and of 
the relations of these countries, its nationals and merchants anion» 
themselves and to third states on the international plane. The conventions 
signed by the Scandinavian states in the beginning of the thirties were in 
like way of a regional character. Before the Second World War the Soviet 
Union was the only socialist country taking part in world trade and -  
in European' -  private international law. Although capitalist efforts to 
isolate the Soviet Union in the political, economic spheres and so to say 
in all conditions of life, relaxed somewhat in the thirties, so that the 
idle of the Soviet Lnion in international life expanded considerably, to 
an extent that she could join certain international conventions, in her 
internal lelations and domestic law the need for a regulation of private 
international law as a whole was not vet mature or pressing. This need, 
and in the temporal order the situation following upon the Second World 
\\ ai threw open the path to the Soviet Union to join a number of inter­
national conventions, and brought about the conditions for a Soviet 
participation in bilateral and multilateral treaties.
I he atmosphere of the cold war spreading soon after the Second 
World War was again adverse to the codication of private international 
law. Nevertheless regulation began, basically in the relations of the socia­
list countries among themselves. In addition to the bilateral conventions 
of legal assistance and multipartite treaties in the first order treaties 
affecting economic life, then the creation of the General Conditions of 
Delivery of Goods of the Comeeon Countries mostly containing provisions 
of direct regulation contributed too to a new type of “codification” .12 
Besides the partly self о mtained codes of private international law (e »  
the Czechoslovak and Polish), partly those attached to rules of substan­
tive law (e. g. in the Soviet Union) came to life in succession.13 In the 
capitalist world regulation presents two to some extent controversial
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trends. The one is the doctrine corresponding to the pragmatic-empiric 
tendency rejecting condification.14 This trend cropped up in a number of 
countries of the world with the economic, political and ideological pene­
tration of the United States. At the same time economic needs insisted 
on the contrary, and sponsored by the United Nations and the European 
Economic Community several international conventions or regional 
agreements were born (so e. g. the Conditions Generales). Notwithstanding 
the paragmatic-empiric tendency even in the United States the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) of 1962 was compiled, though as domestic law, 
still the uniform and statutory law replacing the disunity was an achieve­
ment. .
b)  In the socialist countries the need for a codification of private 
international law, or more correctly, confict law, is justified not only by 
the existence of a Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Polish statutory regulation.
Nor is this regulation, or positions taken in literature which provide the 
potentialities for a codification.15 As a matter of fact as far as Hungary 
is concerned, by the side of the in general emphasized need for a socialist 
codification the fact may have a word to say that this country has not 
vet come to see the first codification of private international law, although 
it has already been flooded by the second wave ol codification.18 In oui 
opinion the codification of Hungarian private international will neverthe­
less come into being as the product of the under Hungarian conditions 
fairly drawn out first wave of codification streaming into the second s 
wave.
I f  now the codifications of private international law already on the 
statute books of the countries concerned are reviewed, then it may be said 
that these have natured to acts of legislation only when the domestic 
substantive portion of conflict law as codified by private international 
law has already been codified. The fact that the first partial legislations 
(e. g. the Code civil, or the Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) do not 
attach the conflict law to the direct regulation of substantive law as a 
separate part still indicates that private international law has not vet 
parted companv with domestic law and has not gained sufficient stiength. 
Later private international law constituting a separate part in the civil 
code (e. g. in the Einführungsgesetz, Codice civile, the Greek Civil Code, 
etc.) betrays a certain independence of private international law, the 
recognition of the at least formal difference of the relevant regulation 
(conflict law), and the awakening to consciousness of this part of the 
law.
In Hungary Professor Szäszy’s draft of before the Second World 
War and then his draft of 1947 for want of a codification of substantive 
law could not become acts of legislation. Conflict law, by way of its indi­
rect regulation cannot go on growing unless the domestic substantive 
law has been stabilized, cast into the form of a statute, i. e. it has become 
codified law.
Naturally as far as the international aspects are concerned there are 
exceptions, of the two exceptions the Polish Code of Private International
THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF CODIFICATION___________________ 7
Law of 1926 was prompted by the territorial disunity of the law, and so 
the need for a regulation of inter-territorial private law, i. e. the inter- 
territorial regulation of conflict law paved the wav for the codification of 
private international law. On the other hand the Código Justamente with 
its redundant casuistry brings under regulation problem of private inter­
national law in the relations of states most of which had civil codes of 
their own dating back to the 19th century and showing a strong Spanish 
influence. Even when the code is of the 20th centurv (e. g. in Brazil), 
and presents a certain approach to another (e. g. then German) law, the 
differences are not insurmountable to an extent obstructing the compila­
tion of a common code.
In the course of capitalistic evolution in Hungary private law was 
not codified.17 In such circumstances a comprehensive codification of 
private international law was out of the question. Yet even beyond this 
partial legislation having a role in the shaping of non-written Hungarian 
bourgeois private law, in judicial practice and also in jurisprudence 
reached the stage of the recognition of the independence of private inter­
national law only at a relatively late phase of bourgeois evolution. (I. e. 
in a sense that it was worth while to deal with it at all.) Owing to the 
undeveloped state of international economic relations and also to the 
close attachment of the country to Austria in Hungarian bourgeois private 
law of the age o f the Dual Monarchy questions o f private international law 
never looked beyond personal rights, family law and the law of succession, 
and sporadically to the law of international civil procedure. However, 
private law remained uncodified in Hungary even between the two world 
wars, so that no foundations could be provided for the codification of 
private international law. Even when autonomous codification was still 
wanted, the State which after the First World War regained its inde­
pendence, acceded extensively to treaties subservient to the interests o f 
the ruling classes.
After the Liberation the draft of 194718 was never put on the statute 
book, not only because of the political situation,19 but in general owing 
to the economic and social conditions, and, last but not least, to the state 
of the legal situation. As long as the basic codification was still to lie 
waited for, and there was no codified regulation laving down the founda­
tions of the domestic substantive rules of a futurecode of private internat­
ional law, the codification of the law of conflicts was out of the question. 
(For that matter this is confirmed also by the codification of conflict 
law in this sense by other socialist countries.) The private law legislation 
of the Soviet Union and the union republics, further certain provisions of 
the Foundations of Civil Procedure provide a regulation of conflict law 
throughout the Soviet Union. The new codes of private international 
law of Czechoslovakia and Poland partly follow in the wake of the rele­
vant domestic regulation of substantive law, partly the Polish code of 
civil procedure itself includes comprehensive provisions of conflicts 
of procedural law.
The intensification of international personal and economic relations
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unanimously call for a codification from the economic and social aspects 
of the question.20 At the same time once domestic substantive law lias 
been codified the potentialities will be present for a codification of private 
international law, i. e. conflict law. Besides the economic and social pre­
conditions there was need for a legal basis: i. e. that there should he a well 
established practice in the operation of the fundamental codes (i.e.the civil 
code, the code of family law, labour law etc.) which at the same time 
brought under regulation the problems oi domestic substantive law of 
international conflict law awaiting regulation. Although labour law has 
already undergone a second codification, and also family law will have 
to be re-codified, further the amendment and supplements to the Civil 
Code also insist on a re-statement, all this cannot be an obstacle in the 
way of the codification of private international law. As a matter of fact the 
codification of the conflict rules of private international law, owing to 
the indirect regulation of law, partly is less sensitive to a change of partial 
regulation, partly in the course of codification, in view of indirectness, 
formulation can already take into consideration the changes in economy, 
society and law.
2. What should a Hungarian code of private international law contain?
According to the predominant idea of the socialist theory of law 
codification brings under regulation the critical legal problems of a branch 
of law without a pretence to completeness in a way that the code incor­
porates the general principles ami also theses characteristic of the very 
branch of law.21 As far as private international law is concerned the 
tendencies known by the name of partialist-nationalist theories wanted 
to bring under regulation private international law as part of the private 
or civil law, so to say as part of private law as a branch of law. This doc­
trine found expression in the Einfuhrungsgesetz (EG) and the Codice 
civile.
(a) There is no agreement in socialist private international law on the 
questions whether private international law is part and parcel of civil law, 
or of international law, or whether it is an autonomous branch of law, or 
if not, the totality of legal norms selected on certain considerations ol 
convenience.22 In our opinion the arguments produced by Professor 
Vilaghy in favour of the latter doctrine at the same time demonstrating 
the weaknesses of the former theories23 cannot be but endorsed. In socia­
list circumstances the sections of substantive law, which actually in the 
wider sense of the term constitute the domestic “parent law” of private 
international law (civil, labour, family law, and in a certain sense the 
various procedural laws) have been brought under regulation in self- 
contained codes. As far as Hungarian legislation is concerned these codes 
in general do not contain provision of conflict law, or hardly any. Hence 
relations manifesting themselves as such of private international law. and 
calling for a regulation do not even come within the scope of a single 
branch of law in direct socialist regulation. Consequently the attachment
THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF CODIFICATION 9
of private international law to civil law is the expression of an ill-assor­
ted standpoint which in direct regulation recognizes the principles of 
classification of the socialist legal system, and even gives expression to 
it, whereas in indirect regulation it reverts to the so severely critized 
distinction of public and private law. The allocation of private inter­
national law to international law, notwithstanding the similarity of 
designation, is indefensible even on grounds of formal logic. The substance 
of the legal sources of living conditions embraced by private international 
law does not consist exclusively of treaties, but to a large portion of 
direct and in general indirect rules of domestic substantive law.2'
for that matter the epithet “ international” in the designation pri­
vate international law is not (juite accurate. The facts at issue which in a 
given instance qualify the legal relation as such of private international 
law, are never of an international character. As a matter of fact the inter­
national nature of the alien element in the given fact at issue is deter­
mined by the domestic law. Legal facts are by themselves colourless and 
inodorous phenomena, whose legal significance is given by legal regulat­
ion. \\ hat is called international” element is non-existent, as the assum­
ption of such an element would visualize the “ international” or domestic 
character of the legal phenomena on the ground of a qualification by 
natural law, i. e. a law outside or above the domestic law oft he given state.
I he provision of domestic law which for a definite element establishes 
its alien character, will as far as the given state is concerned find it such as 
being alien yet not international. Klaments of this kind will turn inter­
national only when by way.of a treaty in the relations among the signa­
tory states these elements always qualify as alien, and owing to the treaty 
in fact become international. (The traditions of the universalis!-inter­
nationalist trend are still living.)
 ^et even the characteristic trails of a self contained branch of law 
are absent. I his is the case not merely owing to the want of the unity of 
subject-matter and method (in fact the method o f regulation i.e. direct or 
indirect, is not a genuine method), but because there can be no question 
of an autonomous branch of law. as the scope of law here comprised irres­
pective of whether its regulation is direct or indirect, has but one common 
trait bv that (he civil, family and labour law relations have an alien 
element recognized also by t he home state for which owing toa provision of 
either a treaty or domestic conflict law a regulation in principle departing 
from the otherwise normative domestic law will hold. This formal unity 
is too little for the creation of a branch of law, yet it may be sufficient for 
a scope of law owing its existence to considerations o f expediency.
However, in these circumstances it may be questioned whether when 
the socialist legal systems use the codes for a comprehensive regulation 
of each branch of law there can be talk of private international law. i. e. 
whether a code may be compiled for private international law at all.
( odifieation by branches of law is an unquestioned consideration for the 
purposes of domestic law. although even here legislation is not consistent 
throughout. (So e. g. a uniform regulation of the cooperatives has been
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drawn out for years, and the regulation o f the cooperatives by economic 
sectors is still being maintained.) At the same time practical needs refer 
to the regulation of a definable or detachable section o f a branch of law 
(e. g. the Bulgarian act of legislation on obligations and contracts), or in 
particular to the statutory regulation of certain marginal scopes (so e. g. 
the foreign exchange code, the housing code, etc.) as codes or codifica­
tions. Hence in principle the domestic legal regulation of private inter­
national law is on the whole practicable even under socialist conditions 
¡is a supplement of the direct regulation of substantive law. However, this 
would for practical purposes spread this peculiar mass oi legal relations 
burdened with alien elements if only the large codes are considered at 
least over three, four, or even five codes (the Civil Code, the Code oi Family 
Law, Labour Code, or the Code of Civil Procedure, the Code of Adminis­
trative Procedure) in a way that the definition of certain uniform theses 
(the general part), or the creation of a certain harmony of the peculiarities 
manifesting themselves in the particular codes would be frustrated.
'Idle character of a scope of law of private international law, the 
establishment of a harmony of identities and differences, cannot be 
guaranteed unless by the compilation of a separate code.
h)  However, the content elements of an act of private international 
law come into being in a peculiar way also for other reasons. Although 
there are representatives of the discipline o f private international law, 
who by the subject-matter of it understand conflict law only, even in 
socialist private international law there are several opinions according 
to which by the side of indirect regulation also material ordered by way 
of direct regulation belongs to private international law.25 Here in the 
first place the direct regulation implied in the General Conditions of 
Delivery of Goods of the Comecon countries has an ordering function. 
Moreover in the not too distant future obviously the spread of treaties of 
this type is looming. Beyond this private international law recognizing 
conflict law only considers the part of the subject-matter implying direct 
regulation by treaties an integral part of either civil law, etc., or inter­
national law. Here disintegration and disunity are even more critical. 
Hence as for codification the question is whether only conflict law should 
be codified, or if direct regulation is accepted as part and parcel of private 
international law, this direct regulation should also be included. A further 
question is to what extent questions brought under regulation by a treaty 
may be made subject to new regulation, when this treaty has already been 
ratified bv the state compiling the code.
The two, direct and indirect, methods of regulation manifesting 
themselves in private international law to a certain degree define the 
method of the formulation of legal rules. I f  the social relation implying 
an alien element, i. e. a social relation for the time being in a rough-and- 
ready way of the character of private international law, is brought under 
regulation by directly regulating rules, in the relations to the foreign state 
this regulation cannot be effective unless with the consent of the foreign 
state.26 The territorial and personal effect of the legal rules is incongruous.
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Consequently if the legal rule in question has to be enforced in the terri­
tory of the foreign state, a relevant provision of this foreign state will he 
needed. Under these circumstances the direct regulation of social relations 
containing an alien element, i. e. relations qualifying as such of private 
international law, is inconceivable unless by an agreement between the 
states concerned, i. e. a treaty. (Naturally in principle it is imaginable 
that direct regulation in the given case ignores the alien element, and 
settles the question accordingly. On the other hand here in the relations 
to the given state owing to the conscious omission o f the alien element the 
legal relation loses its character of private international law.27 So e. g. the 
provision in clause (3) §. 42 of the Introductory Act to the Hungarian 
Code of Family Law.)
In social relations implying an alien element recognized bv the 
statutory regulation, still not brought under regulation by a treaty, 
simultaneously with the inclusion and recognition o f the alien element 
only regulation by a rule of remission and transmission, or by way of a 
conflict rule will be feasible. (Here a unilateral conflict rule may be 
ignored.)
Owing to the duality of regulation the statuory regulation of private 
inteinational law will of necessity present a dual character, and a compren- 
sive codification such as is called for and possible at the codification of 
domestic substantive law, is out of the question from the very outset. 
Since, however, the states by way of treaties in their relations to various 
states agree on a regulation of different relations of private international 
law recognized to be burdened by alien elements, a regulation by way of 
treaties will become one o f a dual character, direct and indirect. It is only 
in recent legislations that direct regulation o f substantive law by treaties 
is making headway extensively, whereas a large portion of treaties is 
still made on the pattern of the earlier, indirect met hod, i. e. following the 
principle of conflict law. On the other hand domestic regulation, if it is 
not the enactment of a treaty, cannot apply a codification of a method 
other than the one in general implied in the enactment o f conflict law.
Tn such and similar circumstances the uniform regulation of the 
subject-matter of private international law, when for the time being 
problems of volume are set aside, in a single domestic code is unfeasible 
for the very reason that the various treaties too contain controversial 
provisions in their relations to the various states. Thus the preservation 
of these provisions, and possibly their compilation in a single code would 
at most produce a codification very much on the pattern of the rather 
casuistic Allgemeines Landrccht, but never a comprehensive regulation 
of typical phenomena.
What follows logically from what has been set forth so far is that the 
codification of private international law (1) is in the first place of the 
nature o f conflict law; (2) does not affect the already effective bilateral 
and multilateral treaties: and (3) as a codification of conflict law serves 
the uniform, comprehensive statutory regulation of typical phenomena 
not yet brought under regulation by treaties.
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c)  The conflict law codification of private international law is not 
merely supplying a deficiency, i. e. it is a necessary, yet secondary, supple­
mentary statutory regulation. Although in point of fact there is a wel­
come increase in regulation by treaties as far as both states and jurisdic­
tions are concerned, and even a certain concerted tendency may be re­
corded, still owing to the limitation of the parties and the legal relations 
brought under regulation treaties cannot bring under control the scope 
governed by private international law in its entirety. Still what belongs 
to this scope ? In recent literature one after the other owing to the alien 
element scopes of law of an international character turn up such as e. g. 
international fiscal law,28 which set out on the path o f regulation only a 
few decades before.
The social relations allocated to private international law manifest 
themselves with volumes of different considerations and of a manifold 
character.29 In socialist law family law and labour law, now autonomous 
branches of law, and the historical parent law, i. e. civil law constitute 
the body of regulation. (Naturally since each state sets out from the 
volume of the branch of law as defined by domestic law, a classification 
by branches of law does not indicate a uniform volume, even when the 
notional volume theoretically extends to these branches of law.)
In capitalist legal systems which in this respect more or less still 
maintain the traditional distinction between public and private law, the 
part of the private law matter containing an alien element may uniformly 
consitute the domestic legal foundations of private international law. 
However, in the socialist legal system the separation by branches of law 
of the three scopes of substantive law, viz. civil, family and labour law, 
has gradually shaped the laws of motion of these branches of law of their 
own, their intrinsic mechanism, the specific legal regulation in certain 
respects departing from that o f the historic parent law, i. e. civil law. In 
these circumstances the uniform regulation by a single code of the legal 
relations of the first scope of substantive law containing an alien element, 
in many respects departing from the traditional and possessing regularities 
of its own partly from the very outset confronts the codifier with greater 
difficulties than encountered by the makers of capitalist codes, partly 
sets up obstacles when it comes to harmonize international relations or 
to formulate the general and uniform principles. (This may perhaps 
account for the Soviet statutory regulation in a form attached to the 
Fundamental Principles.)
At the same time it stands to reason that by the side of the problems 
of substantive law those of the procedural laws cannot be ignored alto­
gether. The regulation of questions of procedural law touching on civil 
law and taking into consideration the alien element, i. e. a regulation 
with a bearing on international relations, owing to the stronger ties 
attaching procedural law to the sovereign power, goes more into details 
and is in many respects on a lower level than regulation relating to subs­
tantive law. In the scope of the procedural laws the effects of the forum 
system of the given country prevails in a by far more decisive manner
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than ill substantive law. In recent socialist legislation strictly speaking 
there are again two solutions in procedural law. The one is the system 
adopted by the Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure, which within the 
framework of civil procedure (and certain provisions applying to extra­
judicial procedure) has incorporated provisions of private international 
law.30 The other method is the consolidated regulation of judicial and 
extra-judicial civil procedure within the framework of civil procedure 
yet in a manner segregated from it. This method o f regulation has been 
adopted by the Foundations of civil procedural law in the Soviet legal 
system (Articles 59 to 64), and also by the Polish regulation of civil pro­
cedure (Articles 1096 to 1153 of the Code). This is also the method embod­
ied by the Czechoslovak act of private international law and procedural 
law (Articles 48 to 68.) In Czechoslovak law the consolidation of provi­
sions of substantive law and those of procedural law in a single act is, in 
view of the alien element implied, already an indication of the shift of the 
centre ol gravity. At the same time the Czechoslovak act still follows 
the traditional concept that the provisions of procedural law apply 
exclusively to judicial and notarial procedure, i. e. to procedure within 
the judiciary.
However, in my opinion the regulation of questions of procedural 
law, which are closely tied up with civil, family or labour law relations 
containing an alien element to an extent that their segregated regulation 
is called for, do not stop short of the limits of the procedure subordinate 
to the organization of the judiciary. Essentially these limits have already 
been pierced by the provisions which extend to arbitral procedure settling 
disputes of private international law.31 However, essentially this is but 
an extension of certain provisions to international arbitration without 
the pretence to uniform regulation. Still there is hardly a procedural 
regulation which would apply to a method if procedure gathering in 
importance in modern evolution, yet not taking place before a judicial 
authority. It is not exclusively in socialist evolution that we may witness 
the growing significance of the alien element possibly turning up on the 
procedural side of a problem of substantive private internationallawin the 
course of procedure before the various committees of conciliation or in 
general before the agencies of public administration, or in the socialist 
countries, before the local government councils (so e. g. in pupillary 
cases) to the prejudice of the ordinary courts o f law or arbitration and 
of other judicial organs (e. g. notary public).
It is with this development in view that the Hungarian draft of 
1670'*- transgresses the earlier framework of regulation when in the 
course of the regula t ion of procedural questions of an international charac­
ter it does not narrow down regulation to procedure before the organs of 
the judiciary or arbitration.
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3. System of the act of private international law.
Irrespective of whether private international law is an autonomous 
branch of law, or simply a scope of law, in connexion with a statutory 
regulation the mutual relations of the legal and doctrinal system will come 
into prominence. One of the first problems which had to be solved at the 
codification of civil law in Hungary was the establishment of the piincip- 
les and systems which were then embodied by the Civil Code.33 \\ hen now 
the state of preparedness of the codification of private international law 
is sought for in the state of codification of the underlying domestic subs­
tantive (and naturally procedural) law then e. g. the lesser or greater 
divergences in the statutory and doctrinal system manifesting itself in 
the civil code will almost infallibly have their repercussions on private 
international law.
The fact that in the substance of private international law an act of 
private international law can but be the backbone, whereas the parti­
cular members, and their forms of manifestation will be subject to both 
statutory regulation, and regulation by bipartite, or multipartite treaties, 
concerns the content rather than the system and consequently of necessity 
creates a difference between theory and statutory regulation. (By the 
side of all these we cannot ignore international custom and to a certain 
extent judicial practice.)
As regards the Hungarian drafts the system itself presents a close 
association with the theoretical notions. The system of Professor Szaszy’s 
draft of 1947, in agreement with the doctrinal notion, is split up into 
general and particular provisions. (It should be remembered that the five 
draft civil codes compiled between 1900 and 1928 omit the so-called 
General Part altogether.) In their intrinsic system both the general and 
special parts of Szaszy’s draft are in agreement with the system of his 
theoretical analyses and exposition with the additions which the need 
for raising the question of jurisdiction and of certain procedural problems 
owing to changes in the author s opinion in the meantime, has demanded.
The system of the 1968 draft is by far not so homogeneous. Although 
this draft following in the wake of Professor Szaszy’s draft among the 
general rules in a conspicuous form brings under regulation the pro­
blems of domestic law and nationally, and in a separate chapter, bet­
ween the provisions governing persons and ownership, the legal trans­
actions, at the same time it devotes a separate chapter to obligations. 
Else in the system of this draft among and after the recognized parts of 
civil law provisions governing family law, jurisdiction and competence 
and labour law have been inserted. This system gives expression to a 
combination of the different opinions in the background o( which, at 
least in this form, there is no uniform theory.
The 1970 draft in its system consistency carries through the princip­
les followed in the course of compilation of the Civil Code, and gene­
ralizes these for the purposes of private international law in a way to 
prevent considerations of the peculiarities of conflict law from getting
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lost. I his draft too contains general norms. However, these genera] 
norms set out from the assumption that only questions of necessity 
emerging owing to the system of conflict law belong to the general part. 
In addition to a general indication of the purpose and effect of the act 
these norms include the definition o f the classification, remission and 
transmission (renvoi), the establishment o f the content of foreign law, 
the waiving of the application of reciprocity and the application of 
foreign law. (I.e. a peculiar theory of legal norms springing up from the 
method of regulation.) So e.g. no absolutized connecting factors have 
been displayed or laid stress on in this draft (e.g. domestic law in Professor 
Szaszy’s draft, or in the 1908 draft), nor the question of jurisdiction, 
which has been brought under detailed regulation in a separate chapter.
Following upon the general part the chapters on personal rights 
(within it the rules governing man and State ¡is subjects at law, juristic 
persons and merchants), then on property, obligations, intellectual pro­
perty, succession (so far uniform with the traditional socialist civil law), 
further the chapters on family law, labour law, jurisdiction and com­
petence, procedural provisions and the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign decisions follow. I.e. in this system the underlying concept of 
substantive law as taken up in the Civil Code has been completed with 
notions ol family law, labour law, jurisdiction and procedure, and the 
regulation of the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions. In its 
inner system only the two chapters on the law of obligations and family 
law are split up into three sections each. Section I of the chapter on the law 
of obligations contains the general provisions governing contracts, Section 
11 applies to the particular types of contracts, Section I I I  contains the 
conflict rules o f damages and unjust enrichment. As for its structure this 
chapter departs from the Civil Code in so far as it puts the general rules 
applying to contracts and the conflict rules relating to the particular 
types of contracts in succession in the proper order, whereas in the Civil 
(ode extra-contractual liability has been brought under regulation in 
a way inserted between the two sections governing contracts. H'he sub­
division of the chapter on family law is in agreement with the traditional 
tripartite division of family law, viz. matrimony, kinship, guardianship 
and curatorship.
1. Connecting factors -  general conflict law clauses -  principles of codi­
fication.
In the course of the codification of private international law the 
question may be asked whether there are, or may at all be, principles 
which embrace codification as a whole, i.e. qualify as principles of codi­
fication.31
a) A survey of the evolution of private international law will betray 
that principles of codification can be discovered only in the recent phase 
of evolution. For the want of such principles in the earlier phases historic­
al causes may account. Although in this respect Hungarian practice goes
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to extremes, when the number of theoretical papers almost approaches 
that of the actual legal cases,35 still it must be remembered that for 
a long time in the evolution of private international law scientific opinions 
had so to say a significance surpassing that of statutory legislation or 
judicial practice. As far as conditions in Hungary are concerned, 
private international law was more of a literary law (“book discipline” ) 
rather than statutory or judge-made law.
When now peculiar Hungarian backwardness is ignored, foreign 
experience offers a brighter picture in this respect. Still not even this 
picture is void of ambiguities. As a matter of fact on a broad average 
the statement may be made that the theoretical generalizations derived 
from the basically case-law nature of Anglo-Saxon law set out from the 
law of the forum and the mutual relation of the exceptions from this 
law. This is what of necessity manifests itself also in literature. On the 
other hand in the continental legal systems literature as well as legislat­
ion in their approach of the problems of principles of codification for a 
long time set out from the absolutization of, and stress on, a few con­
necting factors (and even here priority was given to domestic law).
The raise of the connecting factors to principles of codification36 
may essentially be explained by the circumstance that in the continental 
legal systems the evolution of the 19th century thrust into prominence 
nationality and raised it to a connecting factor of the first degree. Other 
connecting factors as expedients appeared only in relation to nationality. 
The priority given to domestic law was closely associated with the 
principle of exclusive jurisdiction (suits of personal status) at a time 
when in the territory o f Anglo-Saxon law the lex domicilii was made the 
connecting factor of the law of persons.37 The appearance of terri­
toriality as the law of the forum on the Continent indirectly led as an 
expedient of jurisdiction to regulations somewhat similar to those of 
Anglo-Saxon law.
The latest forum approach of American law is an inevitable expans­
ion o f territoriality, the lex fori,™ under circumstances where case-laav 
still has priority. The evolution of continental law departs from this, 
and so also the attitude to the principles of codification, which has be­
come manifest in the given continental legal systems.
As a matter of fact on the Continent in literature often prominence 
was given to the codification of private international law. Since, however, 
codification itself mostly takes place on definite policy-making prin­
ciples, for a long time two things were understood by the principles of 
codification, viz. on the one part the emphasis or absolutization of a 
definite connecting factor or factors, and on the other, in like way with 
an emphasis, the solution in the one way or the other of certain general 
questions and of necessity concomitant of conflict law regulation (such 
as classification, remission and transmission (renvoi), choice of law, etc.). 
These positions cannot be considered such of a policy-making character 
in codification. As a matter of fact the codification of conflict law of
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necessity implies the recourse to certain connecting factors. However, for 
a long time this recourse to connecting factors manifested itself in sim­
plification and undue exploitation of a few principles rather than in the 
formulation of self-contained principles o f codification. In point of fact 
certain connecting factors or certain solutions to questions of principle 
at tire same time became principles of codification.
h) However, the presentation of connecting factors as principles of 
codification soon brought about that partly the possible combinations of 
the game of logic were exhausted, partly this reasoning in a circle in­
evitably triggered a trend manifesting itself as the scientific and practical 
introduction of new, logically conceived principles. By this wav then 
gcneial clauses of conflict law as developed from the connecting factors 
came to the fore.
Recent discussions in literature exploit “principles” of recent date 
in quantities. From the emphasis laid on the importance o f the com- 
paiison and unification of law the demand for Geselzeshannonie has 
developed.39 On the Continent then the doctrines of the spezifische 
Leistung (specific performance),40 the strongest interconnexion,41 
identical judgement by the majority of laws42, and the duplication of 
the conflict rule have appeared.43 At the dame time in response to the 
influence of Anglo-Saxon law the principles of neo-comity,44 the better 
law,45 self-restraint18 and of the earlier principles the safeguard of 
vested rights47 have emerged. After the “escape” into domestic law 
developments in private international law have reached the stage of 
“escape to general clauses” . To all this then the principle of peaceful 
coexistence for a long time already emphasized by socialist jurists has 
acceded.
In the course of the codification o f private international law Ibis 
plethora of principles can beturned to good account only to the extent 
it is serviceable for the expression of the needs arising from the economic 
and social conditions of the country is question. The connecting factors 
are not principles of codification. With due regard to the methods of the 
various legal systems which may come into consideration for the regulation 
ofeonf lift law, it may besaid that the connecting factors which in a manner 
suiting the economic and social arrangements of the given state, indirectly 
in t he interest of the development of peaceful international economic and 
personal relations lend themselves for decreeing the application of the 
law of the country which in the opinion o f the legislator satisfies the 
interests o f the ruling class best for the civil, family, or labour law 
relation implying an alien element. The connecting factor, owing to its 
normative, colourless, savourless character, by itself does not express the 
interest and will of the legislator. Whereas the direct rules of domestic 
law by the appropriate formulation of the rules of conduct purpose the 
achievement of ends conforming to the intentions of the legislator by the 
means of the law in a way that statutory regulation directly expresses 
theseends, this cannot be the ease with the application of the connecting 
factors. Here the only chance offering itself at codification is to formulate
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the legal norm so as to decree the application o f the corresponding 
foreign or domestic law by indirect regulation.
However, a principle o f law derived from judicial practice (case- 
law), or from literature by way of theory is not suitable for performing 
the function of the principles of codification, not even as a more in­
direct connecting factor. In the scopes laid out by judicial practice in 
private international law, and here we have in mind not only the countri­
es of case-law, but also the continental legal systems, socialist doctrine 
cannot agree with a statutory regulation which e.g. by authority con­
ferred by clause (2) §. 1 of the ZGB permits free law-making by the 
judge, or in private international law, the completely free creation of 
legal norms, e.g. by permitting the choice of the better law. For similar 
reasons also the principles of neo-comity or governmental interest are 
impracticable for this function.18
At t he same time we cannot ignore that in the first place in the 
practice of the socialist countries, but even in that o f certain capitalist 
countries, as well as in the positions taken by some of the authors on 
law principles are proclaimed ever more vigorously, which properly are 
not connecting factors, i.e. they do not define the method by which 
a relation may be established between the fact at issue o f conflict law 
and the legal system to be applied, still in general permit the choice of 
the law to be applied by the judge from among the several legal systems 
which in principle may come into consideration, in conformity with the 
general clause. This is the sense which has to be attributed to the prin­
ciples of neocomitv and governmental interest. The principles o f the 
spezifische Leislung, self-restraint, strongest interconnexion have about 
the same significance. Although on the soil of realities, still with a prag­
matic character, void of a policy-making unity, these principles tend 
towards a case-law like solution.Similarly the principle of better law or 
better rule may also be the means of law-making by the judge. Essentially 
this principle is one of the generalized forms of those mentioned before.
The principle of an identical judgement by the majority of laws or 
of the duplication of the conflict rule has developed in a logical way. 
(What is peculiar here is that scholars like Szászy, who otherwise simul­
taneously with rejecting renvoi attributes moderate significance onh' to 
the principle of strongest inter-connexion, formulates the principles of 
identical judgement by the majority of laws and the duplication of the 
conflict rule on logical grounds.)
As theses of codification these principles could owing to the ex­
tremely wide scope allowed to judicial contingency to the prejudice of 
the stability of legality hardly find a place in a socialist code of private 
international law.4" Still to some extent these principles may have and 
even have to be resorted to.
The comparison of laws, or the unification of laws, the principle of 
Geselzesharmonie may be a target in the legislative process, still exactly 
• owing to direct regulation the same conflict rules will not in all cases 
lead to the same actual provisions. Consequently in the preparatory
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stage o f legislation these principles may have useful and important 
functions to perform, still in their actual form, for the very reason of 
their positivist character, are not suited for the application as principles 
o f codification.
c) Of the principles coming forward in the practice o f private inter­
national law, in treaties, literature and in domestic statutory rules those 
may become principles of codification which may be formulated with the 
proper precision and delimitation even in the wording of a code of private 
international law.
In our opinion in this understanding a distinction ought to be made 
between principles which as policy-making theses direct codification 
work in legislation, even when not all of t hese turn into concrete statutes, 
and others, which as principles of codification appear in a normative 
formulation.
However, these principles cannot be legal commonplaces, as e.g. the 
postulates of Reese and Chatham formulated in ten points.50 Not even 
in the narrower sense approved by Professor Szaszy, i.e. that the judiciary 
has to follow the instructions o f its own legislators, provided these are 
constitutional, or that at determining a concrete case the judge has to 
hear in mind the ends of his own legal rules.These principles and postulat­
es are mostly the hazy, misleading and obscure formulations of the 
consideration developed by the socialist theory of state and law and 
formulated we may safely say with greater precision in a way normative 
for any application of the law or legislation.
The principles to be applied in the process of codifying socialist 
private international law may be considered in their formulation by 
Dr. .Madl the proper starting-point.51 According to Madl the policy­
making and scientificconsiderations which define and describe codification 
should imply (1) that the code should extend to the whole field of sui 
generis conflict law relations; (2) that codification cannot rely on an 
absolut ized connecting factor, or two, but has to set out from Hungarian 
economic and social reality; (3) that codification should take into con­
sideration opinions and expedients manifest in international codification; 
and (4) that the regulation of conflict law should preferably decree the 
application of a single legal system to legal relations in reality con­
stituting a unity. Of these the one under (3) should essentially be an 
absolutely normative consideration in the preparatory stage of codificat­
ion, whereas the one under (1) expresses the completeness, i.e. the 
codified state of legislation. Considerations (2) and (4) on the other hand 
arc absolutely normative for the methodological consideration of con­
crete formulation.
However, as a starting-point the principle o f the codification of 
private international law as a whole stressed in all socialist legal systems 
should be accepted. This principle is that of peaceful coexistence. Essen­
tially the socialist states and so Hungary has in the fii-st place brought 
under regulation the civil, family and labour law relations in a com­
prehensive, quasi-code form, and has defined the law to be applied to
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such relations, merely in order to advance the development of peaceful 
international relations. Hence the target of the act o f legislation is to 
promote peaceful international relations and within them that of eco­
nomic and personal ties. However, this statement will have an effect 
only if it is carried through the concrete regulation, and continues to 
embody the policy-making thesis.
It is the principle of codification, which has to find expression in 
concrete formulation in the preparatory stage ol legislation, that the 
code of private international law should preferably cover the entire 
scope of conflict law relations belonging to private international law. 
I.e. not the sui generis conflict law relations, as an alien element recogniz­
ed by Hungarian law may occur not only in civil, family and labour law 
relations which are not governed by a treaty, so that conflict law regulat­
ion will be called for. It is namely beyond doubt that regulation will 
have to extend to all civil, family and labour law relations containing 
an alien element, but not subject to a treaty. Still beyond this the con­
flict rules promoting substantive legal regulation to a certain extent 
have to contain the partly conflict law, partly direct rules which affect 
questions of procedural law associated with civil, family, or labour law 
relations incorporating an alien element. However, exactly in view of 
a claim to completeness not even here can we content ourselves with the 
regulation of judicial procedure, but in general have to set out from the 
need for the regulation of procedural law. Naturally where for the in­
stitution of proceedings according to Hungarian law the judiciary or any 
other agency of the administration of justice has competence, there the 
specific rules have to be stressed or preserved.
However, sui generis regulation does imply not only the postulate 
of the completeness of tlie conflict rules of private international law, but 
at the same time the shaping of a comprehensive, elastic method of 
regulation, which in view of the different character of the legal lelations 
brought under regulation, regulates conflict law though with an elasticity 
of different degrees yet with a method implying intrinsic completeness, 
breakdown and gradualness.
The recourse to foreign examples receives a specific stress. The use 
of theses formulated by the various treaties, of the practice and literature 
of the socialist and non-socialist countries in private international law, 
further of relevant provisions of the countries having a legislation o f 
their own in this field, has gained in significance in the first place m 
comparative law52 and unification of law making headway in the 20th 
century, and their association with private international law.5S
The representatives of the universalist and internationalist trend, 
who wanted to have the problems of conflict law regulated by treaties, 
and in general undervalued the domestic regulation, i.e. the codification 
of conflict law, owing to the potentialities offered by comparative 
activity in the 19th century in general refrained from giving prominence 
to the recourse to foreign examples, but strove for the elaboration of 
general principles which may be considered such ol natural law. I he
THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF CODIFICATION 21
partialist-nationalist tendency, which in general preferred domestic 
statutory regulation, although it did not reject comparative law alto­
gether, still it preferred the extension o f the nationalistic character of 
domestic direct regulation to conflict law. Finally there was the prag­
matic-empiric tendency which opposed codification of anv kind, and 
essentially wanted foreign experience exploited by judicial practice. 
At the same time in modern evolution the tendencies urging codification 
in the first place in continental literature decidedly laid stress on the 
functions of comparative law, and through it on the attainment of the 
6esetzesharinonic, and in the last resort of convergence, instead of co­
existence.
'I'he problem has its roots in the utility o f foreign examples which 
may he resorted to for the codification of private international law, when 
so to say by sterilizing the one thesis or the other suggestions are forthcom­
ing for the use of a rule considered useful. However, harmony may he 
studied only on the ground o f a given legal system, by setting Out from 
given economic and social conditions.
Kven if the partial-nationalist theory cannot he approved, it has to 
he admitted that the domestic statutory regulation of conflict law 
(which therefore does not mean the enactment o f a bilateral or a mul­
tilateral treaty) has to set out from the economic and social system of the 
given state, and its legal arrangements. So in Hungary only a statutory 
regulation of private international law (conflict law) is conceivable 
which is attached to the domestic substantive law, and is in agreement 
with domestic direct regulation.
It was one of the endeavours of bourgeois society to free the legal 
system of its intrinsic contradictions. Under socialist conditions owing 
to the unity of the basic economic and social relations and the liquidai 
i°n of contradictions this endeavour is patent even more than in bourgeois 
society. Hence codification cannot set out but from the domestic legal 
system whose civil, family, or labour law relations incorporât«! an alien 
element, and consequently the question o f the law to be applied has 
to he decided. From this point of view the legal relations o f conflict law 
brought under statutory regulation are not «>f uniform significance. 
Basically two large groups may be distinguished. The one group consists 
of iides which even in domestic law are peremptory to various degr«‘cs, 
and therefore hardly, or not at all, recognize the free disposition of the 
parties. Such are ownership, regulation of the personal status, family 
law', labour law, the law' of succession, and in general procedural law. 
At the same time the law governing commercial transactions, the part 
of contract law dealing with contracts proper, recognize permissive 
regulation in both domestic and international law within a wide scope 
and so also the control of international economic relations by way of 
a choice o f law'.
Naturally there arc differences in t he exploitation of international 
experiences according as exploitation takes place in overwhelmingly* 
peremptory scopes, or overwhelmingly permissive scopes. In the sphere
22 L. ASZTALOS
of the law of property, the regulation of the personal status, family law, 
labour law and the law of succession recourse may be had to foreign 
experience, in the first place to agreements on judicial assistance, and 
to the domestic conflict rules of the socialist countries, in so far as these 
are in agreement with the economic and social conditions in Hungary 
(this is always a point of socialist statutory regulation) and there is a 
harmony with the direct regulation of domestic substantive law. As a 
matter of fact in this respect the force of legal traditions recognized as 
correct cannot be ignored.
The situation is an altogether different one in the field o f the law 
of contracts. Since here regulation is in the first place of the permissive 
category, international experience may come into consideration at the 
adaptation of the permissive rules. So in all circumstances attention has 
to be given to the conflict rules of the Hague convention on international 
sales.51 The significance of the adaptation of these rules will not be 
diminished even if Hungary joins the convention and enacts it. As a 
matter of fact owing to the adaption of the provisions of the Hague con­
vention even in relations between the non-signatories the provisions of 
the convention will hold their own. The Vienna Convention of may 
acquire a similar character, as has been the casein Poland where a large 
portion of the provisions of the convention has been incorporated in 
the Code o f Civil Procedure.
Hence a tendency to achieve a formal Geaetzesharmonie is not a 
primordial principle o f socialist codification. In fact as for the content 
socialist codification endeavours to bring about a statutory regulation 
of concflict law which serves the interest of a peaceful development of 
international relations.
The formal principle of harmony cannot be achieved in socialist 
codification because in view of thi? alien element of private intmnational 
law the struggle against discrimination will become even more important 
than formal harmony. In the rules of domestic substantive law the 
principles of socialist codification receive a peremptory formulation, and 
in private international law the formation of the public policy clause 
mostly of a defensive character has been known for a long time already. 
In the private international law of the socialist countries it has been 
generally accepted that the public policy clause may be invoked only 
for the setting aside o f a concrete foreign provision applied to a given 
concrete legal relation, merely for reasons of defence.0'’ Still even 
beyond this, and by the side of the already known domestic equality of 
rights and the most-favoured-nation-clause the1 fight has to be carried 
on against discriminative policy in a positive formulation, i.e. the poten­
tialities will have to be provided for the substitution of posit ive provisions 
for discriminations.
Provisions of this category may turn up partly in the general rules 
of private international law, partly in the way certain statutory pro­
visions have been formulated. The struggle against discrimination is 
closely associated with a principle manifesting itself in private internation­
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al law rather in a legal formulation, viz. the principle o f the lex fori.™ 
The prominence given to the law o f the forum, which in the last resort 
may he tiaced hack to the principle of territoriality, is not only a pecu­
liarly of the Anglo-Saxon legal systems,57 as even in the continental 
legal systems the trend to stay* at home is related to this principle58. 
Although the principle of the basic rule or neo-comity is foreign to 
socialist private international law, still in our opinion neither the other 
extreme can be accepted,69 which even at its starting point avoids 
the provisions of domestic law, and degrades the lex fori to a thesis of 
third-rate importance.
In reality what is questioned is not whether or not the lex fori is 
a connecting factor of the first degree, i.e. it is not its weight as connect­
ing factor which is in prominence. (Naturally in the practice of case-law, 
or o f conflict of overwhelmingly customary law character, the lex fori 
will in all cases emerge as a question o f connecting factor.) What is es­
sential is that in the socialist countries whenever the judge or any other 
authority applies foreign law, this is done on the ground of the provisions 
of domestic law, and never as some sort of a comitas gentium, or basic 
rule, or neo-comity. Exactly owing to socialist legality the application 
of foreign law by the judiciary or any other authority, whenever the 
conditions are present, never implies the right of choice o f those applying 
the law.
However, beyond this the presence of a hazily worded provision 
o f law the trend to stay at home is a natural consequence of judicial 
practice. How to set up a defence against this contingency? The question 
is in the first place one of legislation, and only on secondary considerat­
ion one of the application oflaw. (The “ trend to stay at home” is primarily 
one o f application.) At the compilation of a provision of private inter­
national law' before all the legistator has to set out from the need for 
a regulation of bilateral conflict rules. The method of regulation in prin­
ciple permits the application of foreign law from the very outset. Howe­
ver, this potentiality on grounds of principle is not yet practice. 
Exactly for this reason in conformity with the socialist principle of pea­
ceful coexistence adequate statutory guarantees have to be enacted, 
which prevent a conscious or instinctive “trend to stay at home” , or keep 
it within bounds.
In this connexion two fundamental principles have to be laid down. 
The one is that any person in charge of the application oflaw will develop 
a trend of thought determined by the norms of the legal arrangements 
of a definite state. (1 herefore a classification according to the lex causae, 
i.e. the modern form of natural law, would be absurd.) The classificat­
ion o f the legal facts cannot but set out from the domestic law of the 
judiciary or any other authority. The principle of the lex fori cannot 
be discarded merely because the capitalist countries have abused it 
within a wide scope fora longtime. (In fact it was the principle o f the lex 
fori that was abused, when formally for certain legal relations the ap­
plication of the law of the foreign state was recognized only to disregard
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it by the subsequent application of the principle of the lex fori. This 
was in fact not the use, but the abuse o f a principle. Still in the ret­
rospect this practice brings discredit on those who followed it, and 
therefore it would be foolish to throw out the baby with the bath water.)
What has to be set out from is the law o f the proceeding authority. 
It is this law which establishes the presence of an alien element in the 
given legal relation which calls for the application o f the law o f two, 
or even more states. And yet those are right who notwithstanding the 
statutory regulation are afraid of the “ trend to stay at home.” The 
authority owing to its fundamentally domestic oriented cast o f legal 
mind, in the evaluating activity implied in the process of administration 
of justice inevitably returns to the law of the forum. It is for this reason 
that statutory guarantees have to be enacted which at the well-known 
pitfalls marshal the activities of the proceeding court or authority to the 
proper direction. One of these pitfalls is the classification. A thesis 
should therefore be formulated, which on the assumption of the lex fori 
as starting-point declares that the fact that the foreign law in question 
is unacquainted with a Hungarian legal institution, or knows it with 
. a different content or by another designation, cannot be an obstacle in 
the way of the application of the foreign law. Virtually this guidance 
eliminates the most dangerous pitfalls of the conscious or instinctive 
abuse o f the lex fori.
Another pitfall in the “trend to stay at home” is hidden in the ap­
plication of foreign law and the establishment o f its content. Socialist 
legality has made it the duty of the proceeding court or other authority 
to be acquainted with the law, even if the parties do not refer to it 
(moreover the parties have to be briefed, §. 3 of the Code of Civil Proce­
dure.) As far as foreign law is concerned the expedient which suggests 
itself is to oblige the court or any other authority, in addition to evidence 
submitted by the parties, to collect information of the unknown foreign 
law ex officio (§. 200 of the Code of Civil Procedure.) To this end all 
necessary assistance should be extended, by obliging the Minister of 
Justice to provide the required information. However, beyond this the 
proceeding court or authority should make use of the foreign law to be 
applied not only in its normative form of appearance, but setting out 
from the fact that the laws o f the diffrent social systems basically differ 
from one another, further that the particular legal institutions of the 
states of uniform social system have been brought under regulation 
differently, and that the rules governing these institutions are enforced 
in practice in different interpretations, it has to lay down in a definite 
form that foreign law has to be interpreted in a manner suiting domestic 
practice.
An obstacle to the practical establishment o f the idea of peaceful 
cocxitenee is often the want of reciprocity. Although the application of 
foreign substantive law has formal reciprocity as a pre-condition, and 
that of foreign procedural law substantive reciprocity, often the beginn­
ing of reciprocity in practice may become the cause o f difficulties (e.g. in
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relations to states which have recently gained their independence.) For 
this reason the endeavour not to make the application of foreign law 
conditional on reciprocity unless statute provides otherwise cannot be 
but greeted. A further consolidation o f this principle manifests itself in 
the most tangible form in the rules governing intellectual property. The 
fundamentally territorial character of copyright, patent (industrial pro­
perty) law and of the law of the protection of industrial rights has been 
relieved in the first place by treaties, and here reciprocity may have 
a significant role to plav. At the same time the protection afforded by an 
international convention or on the ground o f reciprocity will primarily 
extend to the property o f the authors, inventors, or patentees. However, 
there may be cases when for the author of a work, the inventor of a not 
patented invention, the innovator and the beneficiary o f a certificate of 
authorship there is no international convention or reciprocity in the 
relation to the given state, whereas following from the extraterritorial 
character of the man and personality protecting rules of socialist law 
the personal rights o f these beneficiaries deserve protection even in the 
absense of a convention or reciprocity.
A decisive test of discriminative practice is the manner in which 
the public policy clause has been formulated and applied. It is for this 
reason.that the socialist works on private international law in a clear- 
cut form emphasize the protective nature of the public policy clause (r,°). 
However, so to say as a guidance of practice the enactment of a statutory 
provision is called for which declares that foreign law cannot be ignored 
for the simple reason that the social system of the foreign state differs 
from that o f Hungary. The series of examples may be continued and in 
particular in the sphere of problems o f jurisdiction cases may turn up 
when the practice of the capitalist states avoids without reference to 
jurisdiction recourse to foreign law, when jurisdiction is considered 
a connecting factor.
5. Some of the methodological problems of codification.
Already in the preceding discussion questions have been asked 
affecting the content o f codification, which at the same time have also 
touched on the methodology of codification and the manner of statutory 
formulation.
This is how the need for a sui generis regulation should be under­
stood, a need which at the same time touches also on the formal side of 
regulation. Yet such a question is also the exploitation of international 
practice and foreign experience, which may be and even has to be utilized 
at the preparatory stage of codification. In the formulation of the parti­
cular theses and provisions sui generis regulation does not only imply that 
the totality o f the scopes to be regulated should la; brought under 
regulation with a pretence to completeness, but at the same time that 
for the intrinsic harmony of the* code this regulation should take place 
according to definite principles. Essentially this may be summed up in
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two theses. The one is that the law decrees01 the application o f preferably 
one legal system to uniform legal relations, and, secondly, that in con­
formity with the differences in the character o f the scopes to be brought 
under regulation, regulation proper should take place in a variety of 
degrees, yet with elasticity.02 gradually, in a multi-stage manner. How­
ever these two policy-making principles can in no circumstances become 
rigid categories. In fact the decreeing of a uniform law, in definite circum­
stances, owing to the risks implied in stereotyped abstraction, preclude 
the elastic method of regulation from the very outset. So regulation and 
the policy-making question turning up in the method of formulating the 
particular provision essentially demand the approach to the same problem 
from two sides wide apart from each other.
In domestic substantive and conflict law regulation as well as in 
regulation by treaties the recent socialist codificat ion waives the once follo­
wed principle of regulation that within the framework of asingle institution 
of law preferably all pertinent questions should be brought under regula- 
t ion. The institutional civil law approach on the Continent and the concomi­
tant condification by institutions o f law has gradually undergone a chan­
ge. Here we may encounter not only a horizontal regulation and within 
it a vertical, but from the very outset a vertical regulation preserving the 
unity of the given code, and even reinforcing this unity.03 Examples 
for this are in a fair number e.g. in the Hungarian Civil Code when the 
definition of the rule o f general liability at a single place (Clause (1) §. 
33!) of the Civil Code) is valid for the whole Code, and strictly speaking 
the references to this definition are also of two kinds. On the one part 
we have a reference to the application of this rule o f liability in the pre­
sence of definite conditions (i.e. the facts-at-issue side), and on the other 
the inevitable exceptions are defined which call for a liability o f another 
degree (differences on the side of the legal consequences.)
A horizontal and vertical method o f regulation uniform with that 
of the Civil Code could owing to conflict law potentialities l e hardly 
adopted for the codification of private international law. However, a 
similar method may not only, but even has to, be used.
There are two examples for a uniform law and elastic regulation, 
which we believe should be mentioned here. The one indicates the con­
sistent application o f a uniform law, when the draft code of private inter­
national law for registered water craft and aircraft decrees the application 
of the law of the state under whose flag or insignia the vehicle or aircraft 
takes part in traffic. This provision strictly speaking wants to guarantee 
the application of a uniform law not on the ground of uniform relations, 
but bv tying the different legal relations to a single, and extremely impor­
tant factor, viz. to the registration of water craft and aircaft. So far in 
international practice the law of the flag (according to certain opinions 
the law o f the country of registration would lie more correct, still here 
this is o f secondary importance only) has been resorted to almost exclu­
sively in relation to substantive law as far as such a craft was concerned. 
The draft too sets out from the law to be applied to the substantive legal
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relations, however, it decrees the application of the law o f the flag also 
to the sale or purchase o f water craft or aircraft (for the sale or purchase 
o f craft already registered), charter, and to the one possibility of establish­
ing the site o f the violation of law. if the violation has taken place on 
board the aircraft or water craft, and also to the employment of workers 
doing service on board (lex loci laboris )
Elastic regulation may come into consideration in a variety o f ways. 
In the literature of private international law in the 20th century the 
opinions emphasizing the importance of judge-made law urge an in its 
essence flexible regulation which even beyond the provisions of clause 
(2) §.l of the Z(!B permits the creation o f law bv the judge, in the first 
place by means of the general conflict law clauses already referred to. 
Hence in this sense elastic formulation wants to substitute flexible judge- 
made law for statutory law.
Socialist regulation cannot approve of this interpretation of elastic 
regulation. The socialist concept of legality does mean not only a solid, 
clear-cut legal practice relying on statutory provisions (which of course is 
not synonymous with exclusive peremptory regulation), but also the uni­
formity of legal practice. As a matter of course this uniform practice does 
presuppose not only a firm and clear-cut statutory regulation, but at the 
same time the intrinsic harmony of the statutory provisions and their 
freedom from contradiction, tending towards results just in the socialist 
acceptation of the term. Again this justice does not mean some sort of a 
scientific abstraction, but a formulation of the provisions embodied by 
the legal norms which expresses not only the interests of the masses of 
the working people, but in the wake of the spread o f an acquaintance 
with the law an economic and political harmony, presupposing the con­
cord of the single men’ and groups. So it is in t he interest of the achieve­
ment of just ends in the socialist sense that elastic regulation in needed.
This elastic regulation does not imply the use of a uniform and iden­
tical method in all scopes brought under regulation by private interna­
tional law. Basically two large scopes may be distinguished. The one is the 
scope of international economy, international commerce and trade, and 
of contracts governed by the law of obligations. The significance of this 
scope is yet greater because as far as contract law is concerned even the 
domestic law of the socialist countries in general relies on permissiveness, 
and this feature manifests itself even more emphatically in the regulation 
of international commodity relations.
The other scope comprises family law, the law o f property, personal 
rights, the law of intellectual property, the law of succession and in gen­
eral jurisdiction and procedural law. Régulât ion applying to these branches 
of law will in general contain large numbers of peremptory provisions. 
So in the first place there is hardly a chance left for a choice of law when 
persons, ownership, family relations and procedure are concerned. At 
the same time here too a multi-stage regulation may have to be preferred. 
As an example the method may serve to which recourse is had for the es­
tablishment of the law normative for the juristic person. Although this
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method in general relies on the country o f registration, still there arc also 
provisions for cases when the given juristic person lias been registered in 
several countries, or when according to the law normative at the seat of 
the juristic person named in the statutes there is no need for 
registration. In this case the law of the country of the seat named in the 
company statutes will be normative. I f  on the other hand according to 
the statutes the juristic person has no seat, or several seats, nor has it 
been registered under the law of any of the countries, the personal law of 
the juristic person will be that of the state where its business headquar­
ters are.
Here it should be noted that in both theory and practice of private 
international law for a long time under the heading o f personal law (lex 
personae,)  only the alternativity of lex patriae and lex domicilii was known. 
Yet the persons participating in international trade today are, at least 
in international exchange o f goods crossing the state frontiers mostly 
juristic, and not physical persons. Therefore the correct act in private 
international law would be that the law normative for persons (lex perso­
nae) extends not only to men, as subjects at law, but also to the State as 
subject at law and to the juristic persons, without, however, speaking 
of identical personal rights. At the same time it should be remembered 
that in international trade the share of the merchant or businessman may 
be considerable. Irrespective of whether it is a one-man firm or a part­
nership, the lex personae otherwise normative for a physical person will 
not be applicable in all circumstances.
Hence the multi-stage method will inevitably remain applicable in 
these scopes otherwise hardly acquainted with the choice of law, if for no 
other reason, so as a guarantee of firm legality. This would be a truly 
elastic regulation. In scopes o f law where by the side o f the peremptory 
rules of domestic law in certain respects a freedom is allowed for contrac­
tual regulation (e. g. in labour law by a contract of employment, in the 
law o f succession by a last will and testament, in the law o f intellectual 
property by licence agreements) the elastic formulation o f regulation 
should aim at (1) definig the characteristic connecting factor in the act 
of legislation itself, and, (2) permissiveness wherever a free choice of 
law is justified (e.g. for licence agreements.)
Finally, and perhaps most appropriate for the demonstration of 
elastic regulation, there is the scope of contracts governing international 
economic relations. Socialist concept recognizes the free choice of law for 
contracts within a narrower or wider sphere. In any case within a sphere 
narrower than accepted by capitalist legal systems as e.g. in family law, 
or for matrimonial property, the free choice of law is not recognized. In 
socialist opinion a choice o f law may be permitted, and so the freedom of 
contracts recognized by domestic law extended, in transactions of com­
modity relations. These are mostly contracts, or licence agreements sig­
ned for the exploitation of intellectual property.
The methods of elastic regulation as far as contracts ai’e concerned 
in all cases lay a stress on the choice of law (a policy correct in every re-
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speet), still by itself, without any detailed contract law regulation this 
permissiveness would strictly speaking open a wide scope to an unscien­
tific recourse to general conflict clauses (e.g. neo-comity, basic rule), 
or to wholly unfounded hypotheses.
Here the proper choice would be the recognition o f the unrestricted 
choice of law However, for want o f this free choice of law even in 
socialist practice the possibility manifested itself of entrusting the spezi- 
fisrhe Leistung (characteristic performance) to the judge. In our opinion 
between a free choice o f law and the determination of a ease according 
to the obligor o f the characteristic performance there should be the sta­
tutory provision which in respect of the particular contracts itself deter­
mines what may be considered the characteristic performance under the 
given contract, and tho element to which it attaches the law to be app­
lied. .Judicial discretion as to whether a dispute under a contract should 
be determined according to the law o f the domicile of the obligor o f the 
characteristic performance, or whether the law o f the business seat or 
headquarters should be normative, may be recognized only for want of 
a statutory regulation as outlined above, or when the contract is atyp­
ical to a degree that the law to be applied cannot be established beyond 
doubt.
However, this three-stage solution in the second stage presupposes 
t ho elaboration of a detailed regulation of the most important types of 
contracts. I f  this is not done, then too frequent occasion would be offered 
to the third degree, i.e. judicial discretion permitted for atypical cases 
only. Or if the second stage is defective, or regulation not elastic enough, 
then a case would present itself for the application o f a rigid, stereotyped 
foreign law in many instances alien to the essence of the given contract.
'fhe so-called second degree, i.e. the statutory establishment of the 
law to be applied by types o f contracts, makes use of the principle of 
spezifisehe Leistung. However, here it is not left to judicial discretion to 
decide which of the performance implied in a typical contract should be 
considered characteristic. If the particular types of contracts are review­
ed, it will be found that basically two large groups may be distinguished. 
In the one group delivery o f goods is implied where the economic aspect 
characteristic o f the performance is the production o f a definite result 
(yet not in the sense of a result as understood for contracts for work, la­
bour and materials). On the other hand there are contracts where the 
subjective aspect of commodity relations is in like way of importance, 
still what is more characteristic is that under the contract a definite ac­
tivity will have to be displayed. In these cases concepts absolutizing do­
mestic law have also for these contracts set out from the obligor of the 
characteristic performance, and ignored that here in the first place the 
site of the performance o f the activity is what counts.
The contracts of the first group include the basic sale and purchase 
of chattels. Here the proper action would be to accept the provisions of 
the Hague Convention on the Conflict o f Laws as general conflict rules. 
However, beyond this in the formulation of the Hague Convention phe-
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nomena manifest themselves which lend themselves readily for a genera­
lization within a wider sphere. Thé one is the application of the law of 
usual residence or the seat (business headquarters). In international 
economic, trading and commercial relations the domestic or even resi­
dential form o f the lex personae is not characteristic o f the relation com­
ing into being between the participants of a commercial transaction. The­
refore in economic relations priority should be given to the least unit of 
the lex personae, i.e. the residence (résidence habituelle) or the seat of- 
business (business headquarters), a policy best serving the interests of 
the development of peaceful international commercial relations. In inter­
national commerce the residence or business headquarters is the least 
common multiplier which in view of the non-specific nature of domestic 
law and the law o f domicile in commercial relations would be acceptable 
for the continued development of vigorous business relations. The other fac­
tor to which recourse may be had is to establish the dateat which the usual 
residence or the headquarters may be established. The Hague Convention 
fixes the receipt of the order as the date for the establishment o f residence 
or headquarters. Therefore it by-passes the often disputed date of the 
conclusion of the contract, and, secondly, attaches the establishment of 
the law to be applied to a single, accurately definable date. The estab­
lishment of the date on this pattern will be needed also when the law of 
the buyer and not that of the seller, or not that of the usual residence 
and the business headquarters has to be applied.
For the other group of contracts the performance of a definite acti­
vity is characteristic (e.g. lease, commission, maintenance, annuity.) In- 
these cases for want of a choice o f law for a lease contract the law of the 
state has to he applied in whose territory the thing is used, for commissi­
on the law of the state where the agent performs his contractual activi­
ties, for maintenance and life-annuity the law of the where maintenance 
or the life-annuity has to be performed.
However, the designation of the performance characteristic accor­
ding to the site of activity will establish the régime of a single law only 
when in conformity with the contract the activity in question has to be 
performed in the territory of a single state. For this reason the charac­
teristic performance in general normative for the particular contracts 
and specified on a statutory level may also call for a solution by degrees. 
So e.g. in the ease of the rather popular and widespread hire o f cars under 
contracts permitting the use of the car in several countries the estab­
lishment of the law by the country of use or activity would introduce 
unwelcome contingencies. In such cases, i.e. when under the contract 
the thing may be used in several countries we shall have to revert to the 
law of persons of a definite degree of the one party. For a conctract of 
hire of chattels permitting use in the territory of several countries the 
proper course suggesting itself would for want o f a choice of law he to 
apply the law of the state where the hirer out has his residence or busi­
ness headquarters. A similar gradation appears to be desirable for con­
tracts of agency or commission, when performance has to he made in the
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territory of several states. Here too we are to revert to t lie one degree or t he 
other of the law of persons. However, in this case, in view of the character 
of the activity the law of the residence or headquarters of the agent or 
commissioner should be applied, at the state on the date of receipt of the 
order.
The rules governing jurisdiction (BS) and procedure lend themselves 
less readily for the formulation of elastic provisions. However, the multi­
stage solution cannot be ignored even here. So e.g. continental literature 
and statutory regulation in general content themselves with the definit­
ion of exclusive jurisdiction, and occasionally of the precluded or compe­
titive jurisdiction. Here in the first place the competitive jurisdiction 
will have to be established. What is typical, in particular in economic 
life, is competitive jurisdiction.
There are two exceptions from under the general rule, viz. exclusive 
and excluded jurisdiction. However, their statutory formulation does not 
present itself with uniform weight, in particular when the earlier uncondi­
tionally exclusive and unconditionally excluded jurisdictions are resolved. 
As a matter of fact in certain cases for a more convenient regulation of 
conditions o f life exceptions should be allowed from exclusive jurisdic­
tion. A case of this sort may be the peremptory statutory rule governing 
the procedure for the establishment of the personal status of Hungarian 
nationals (§. 15 of the Introductory Act to the Code o f Civil Procedure.) 
As a matter of fact under certain circumstances the decree dissolving 
the matrimony of Hungarian nationals domiciled abroad has to be recog­
nized. Although this may formally appear as an exception from under 
exclusive jurisdiction, for practical purposes the matter has to be settled 
as if it were a case of recognition of t he decision o f a foreign authority. On 
the other hand exceptions from under excluded jurisdiction are in each 
case formulated as rules o f jurisdiction. In fact these provisions affect the 
jurisdiction of the Hungarian judiciary or other authorities. Hence the 
multi-stage solution resorted to at the formulation of the rules govern­
ing jurisdiction, or procedural rules, in view of the peculiarity of the pro­
visions of procedural law and jurisdiction, may justify a certain, not too 
considerable departure from the conventional forms.
The policy-making principles of the codification o f private inter­
national law here raised, and in certain respects the suggested methods of 
solution, do not intend to influence the concrete legal solution of the 
problems to be brought under regulation. At most to the extent this is 
necessary in order to throw a light on a concrete example. However, co­
dification, the making o f law, is a first, though long step which in the 
concept embodied by the codification has to be followed by a wholesome 
practice advancing the development of peaceful international personal and 
economic relations.
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«RU.NRSÄTZLICHE FRAGEN IM ZUSAMMENHANG MIT DER KODIFIKATION 
DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT RECHTES
Z US AM M E N FASSUNG
1. Die Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeit der Kodifikation des internationalen Privat- 
rechtes hängt in erster Reihe von wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen ab. 
Auch wenn diese bestehen, kann nur dann kodifiziert werden, wenn die Kodifizierung der 
inneren rechtlichen Regelung, die die Grundlage des Kollisionsrechtes bildet, bereits er­
folgt ist.
2. Bei der inhaltlichen Abgrenzung eines ungarischen internationalen privatrecht­
lichen Gesetzes kann nur die Kodifizierung des Kollisionrechtes uuftauchen, wenn auch 
nach Ansicht des Verfassers das internationale Privatrecht nicht nur die indirekte, sondern 
auch die direkte Regelung umfasst. Die Bedingungen der Kodifizierung im sozialistischen 
Recht, die umfassende Regelung eines Rechtszweiges, sind bei der gesetzlichen Festlegung 
des kollisionsrechtliehen Teils des internationalen Privatrechts nicht vorhanden. Trotzdem 
enthält die Kodifikation eine umfassende, auf die typischen Erscheinungen sich erstreckende 
Verfügung hinsichtlich der ausländische Elemente enthaltenden privatrechtlichen, famili­
enrechtlichen und arbeitsrechtlichen Rechtsverhältnisse, sowie hinsichtlich der wichtigsten 
verfahrensrechtlichen Fragen — ohne die in den zwischenstaatlichen Verträgen geregelten 
Fragen zu berühren.
3. Im allgemeinen Teil des Systems des internationalen privat recht liehen Gesetzes 
werden bloss die unvermeidlichen theoretischen Fragen der Normlehre geregelt. Dann wer­
den die Kollisionsfragen des Personenrechts, des Sachenrechts, des Schuldrechts, des Ur­
heberrechts und des Erbrechts, sowie nach der Regelung des Familienrechts und des 
Arbeitsrechts auch die internationalen Zustündigkeits- und verfahrensrechtliehen Be­
stimmungen geregelt.
Im Zusammenhang mit der neueren Kodifikation des internationalen Privatrechts 
taucht die Frage auf, obes Kodifikationsgrundsätze gibt. Einzelne Verfasser betrachten die 
Anknüpfungsgrundsätze als Kodifikationsgrundsätze und neuestens verbreiteten sich in 
weitem Kreis die kollisionsrechtlichen generellen Klauseln.
Ein grundlegendes Prinzip der sozialistischen internationalen privatrechtlichen 
Kodifikation ist die friedliche Koexistenz. Die Kodifikation muss auf sui generis Art die 
kollisionsrechtlichen Fragen umfassen und dabei müssen nicht nur prinzipielle, sondern 
auch positive Regeln gegen gewisse diskriminativen Unterscheidungen geschaffen werden. 
Der Verfasser befasst sich auch mit der Bedeutung des Forumrechtes.
5. Im Kreis einzelner methodischen Fragen der Kodifikation erscheinen zwei schein­
bar entgegengesetzte Grundsätze: Anwendung des einheitlichen Rechtes und die elastische 
Regelung. Die elastische Regelungsmethode ermöglicht eine mehrstufige Lösung, aber das 
ist abweichend auf den Gebieten mit grösstenteils zwingender, bzw. grösstenteils dispositi­
ver Regelung.
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ПРИНЦИПИАЛЬНЫЕ ВОПРОСЫ В СВЯЗИ С КОДИФИКАЦИЕЙ 
МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ЧАСТНОГО ПРАВА
РЕЗЮМЕ
1. Необходимость и возможность кодификации международного частного 
права зависит в первую очередь от экономических и общественных условий. Даже 
при существовании этих условий кодифицировать можно лишь в том случае, если 
уже осуществлена кодификация внутреннего правового регулирования, образу­
ющего основу коллизионного права.
2. При определении границ содержания венгерского закона о международ­
ном частном нраве может в о з н и к н у т ь  л и ш ь  кодификация коллизионного права, 
хотя по мнению автора международное частное право включает в себя не только 
косвенное, но и прямое регулирование. Условия, требующиеся для кодекса в со­
циалистическом нраве, всеохватывающее регулирование одной отрасли права, не 
существуют при кодификации коллизионной правовой части международного 
частного права. Несмотря на это кодификация -  не затрагивая вопросов, отрегу­
лированных в международных договорах -  содержит всеобъемлягащее распоряже­
ние, распространяющееся на типичные явления, если смотреть с точки зрения со­
держащих иностранные элементы гражданско-правовых, семейно-правовых и 
трудово-правовых правоотношений, а также по важнейшим процессуально-право­
вым вопросам.
3. Система закона о международном частном праве в обшей части регулирует 
лишь неизбежные вопросы норм права. Вслед за этим регулирует коллизионные 
вопросы личного, вещественного, обязательственного права, права продукции 
умственной деятельности и права наследования, затем после правил семейного и 
трудового права регулирует подведомственные и процессуальные правовые рас. 
поряжения.
4. В связи с кодификацией международного частного прада в новые времена 
возникает проблема того, существуют ли кодификационные принципы. I (екоторые 
провозгласили подключающиеся принципы кодификационными принципами и в 
последнее время широко распространились коллизационные правовые генераль­
ные клаузалы.
Основным принципом социалистической международной частно-правовой 
кодификации является мирное сосуществование. Кодификация способом sui generis 
должна охватить коллизионные правовые вопросы и в ходе этого необходимо со­
здавать против определенных дискриминационных различий не только принци­
пиальные, но и позитивные правила. Автор занимается кроме того и значением 
права форума.
5. Среди отдельных методических вопросов кодификации появляются два - 
внешне противоречивые -  принципа: применение единого права и гибкость ре­
гулирования. Гибкая система регулирования дает возможность для многоступенча­
того разрешения, но она различна в большей своей части обязательных, вернее, 
в большей своей части диспозитивных областях регулирования.
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